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Introduction
Since the theory of public finance began in the 19 th century, three famous principles of just taxation based on different normative ideas have been formulated (see, e.g., Musgrave, 1959, for a historical review). The equal sacrifice principle requires that taxation should lead to the same (absolute or relative) loss of utility for everyone. In this way, a symmetrical, and thus fair, treatment of all citizens is ensured. Taxation according to ability to pay, on the other hand, requires that personal tax liability should be positively correlated with the taxpayer's income or wealth and thus provides some kind of vertical equity for people with different financial capacities. In contrast to both equal sacrifice and ability-to-pay, the benefit principle also takes into account how the tax revenue is spent. It postulates that the individual tax burden should be related to the utility gain an agent derives from the governmental expenditures that are financed with her taxes. The benefit principle therefore reflects the quid pro quo fairness known from the market exchange of private goods.
During the last couple of years, these basic concepts of just taxation have been attracting more attention in a field outside the framework of taxation theory in the ordinary sense. So it has become a major topic in the political debate and in economic research how to improve the supply of "global public goods". Climate protection has now become the most prominent of these goods (see, e.g., Kaul Kaul and Conceição, 2006) . Provision of a public good, however, is inefficiently low when agents (or, in the case of an international public good, countries) do not cooperate, such that collective actions are required to overcome this underprovision problem (see, e.g., Sandler, 1992, or Cornes and Sandler, 1996 , for a detailed explanation of this standard result in the theory of public goods).
In the international sphere cooperation often is, as in the case of the Kyoto protocol in climate policy, regulated by a convention which, in particular, stipulates how the contributions to the global public good are to be distributed among the participating countries (especially with climate protection see Stern, 2006, pp. 450-467) . The venerable principles of just taxation become relevant once again for designing the fundamental structure of such burden sharing arrangements: Countries will only be ready to accept an agreement when their advantage is in line with their financial obligations, i.e. if the benefit principle is satisfied. At the same time, cooperation can only be expected to be successful if no nation feels overburdened compared to its partners, and a fair distribution of cooperative efforts is achieved (see Sandler, 2004, pp. 77-79) . This concern for an equitable treatment of all participants is reflected by the equal sacrifice principle. In the field of climate change policy there is, moreover, a broad con-sensus that richer countries have a greater obligation to finance greenhouse gas abatement, and this could be considered to be an application of the ability-to-pay principle.
Despite their importance, and their casual perception in the literature, the principles of just taxation as guidelines for fair burden sharing have not been incorporated systematically into the theory of public goods. The purpose of this paper is therefore to identify an approach where one particular efficient public good allocation that conforms simultaneously to these three principles is selected. Taking the equal sacrifice postulate as the starting point, we proceed as follows: In Section 2, we first describe how the individual sacrifice connected with a certain individual public good contribution can be measured by adopting a willingness-to-pay technique familiar in environmental economics. (For another application of the willingness to pay approach to the standard public good model see Bergstrom, 2006 .) With this approach, individual contributions to the public good that were originally measured in units of the private good are converted into public-goods equivalents so that the public good serves as the numéraire. Thus, in contrast to the classical equal sacrifice approach in the theory of taxation, a cardinal measure for individual utility is not required. In Section 3, we first establish some basic properties of this sacrifice measure that are used throughout the paper. In Section 4, the equity norm is then applied to determine the set of public good allocations for which the level of this sacrifice is identical for all agents. Imposing allocative efficiency for the public good allocation, i.e. the Samuelson rule, as a further normative postulate then gives the desired choice mechanism for public-good allocations. In Section 5, it is shown that this mechanism corresponds to Moulin´s egalitarian-equivalent solution concept (see Moulin, 1987 Moulin, , 1995 .
Thus an alternative justification for this selection mechanism is provided that is more closely related to standard ideas of equal treatment and to the standard concepts of public finance. In this way, it also becomes possible to draw a parallel between the egalitarian equivalent solution in a public goods economy and the classical Lindahl equilibrium which is also done in Section 5. In Section 6, we finally show that the equal sacrifice selection rule described in this paper also satisfies the benefit principle and the ability-to-pay criterion, so that it, indeed, incorporates the three fundamental principles for fair burden sharing. (An empirical account of concepts for fair burden sharing in international environmental agreements is given by Lange, Vogt and Ziegler, 2007.)
Measuring Individual Sacrifice of Public Good Contribution
We consider a standard public-good economy consisting of n agents 1,..., i n = (see the classical treatments in Bergstrom, Blume and Varian, 1986, and Sandler, 1996 
The public good is produced by a constant returns to scale summation technology. If agent i contributes :
g y x = − to the public good, the total supply of the public good is given by
Among all allocations that meet the budget constraint (1), we want to identify those in which the sacrifice for each agent is equal and thus the equal sacrifice principle is satisfied. Applying this normative concept first of all requires the size of personal sacrifice to be measured in an adequate way. In this context, the simplest approach would be to identify agent ' i s sacrifice with the absolute level of her contribution i g . But such a specification of sacrifice is only compatible with ethical intuition when all agents are completely identical, i.e. have the same income and the same preferences. Otherwise, one would expect a smaller income, or a lower preference for the public good, to increase agent i's subjective burden associated with some given contribution level i g , since this contribution then is harder for her to bear.
The problem of finding an adequate measure of subjective individual sacrifice already showed up in the classical treatment of equal sacrifice of taxation where sacrifice was related to the loss of utility of income and not to income itself. In this approach utility has to be cardinally measurable, which is in conflict with the usual assumption of purely ordinal preferences. (For a modern treatment of the classical equal sacrifice approach see, e.g., Mitra and Ok, 1996, or Moyes, 2003) . In the present paper, in which the agents´ utility also depends on public good consumption, a measure of agent ' i s personal sacrifice is obtained by construct-ing a public-good equivalent to her contribution i g . As we take the public good as a numéraire, the problem of having to make use of cardinal measurability of utility that was pertinent in the classical equal sacrifice approach is avoided. 
The meaning of Definition 1 is visualised in Figure 1 .
By Definition 1, individual public-good contributions i g are converted into equivalent publicgood units and thus made comparable. This method for measuring the personal sacrifice is analogous to the assessment of individual willingness to pay well-known from contingent valuation studies in environmental economics (see e.g. Ebert, 1993 , or Kolstad, 2000 , pp.
291-294). So, agent '
is elicited as the answer to a willingness-to-pay question by which agent i is asked how much of the public good she would be ready to give up if − starting from her position ( , ) 
where : 
Properties of the Sacrifice Measure
In this section we want to examine how the level of agent i's sacrifice depends on her position Part of the adjustment that is required by the transition from the original allocation A to a new feasible allocation called A′ then has to be made by the other agents. The change of agent i 's sacrifice, however, is not affected by the precise nature of the adjustments of the other agents so that they do not have to be described explicitly.
(i) If agent i's public good contribution is increased from i g % to i g′ % , her sacrifice obviously increases, since the new indifference curve ( , )
is lower than the original indifference
(ii) If public-good supply grows from G % to G′ % , the argument is a little more complicated and crucially depends on the normality assumption. Letting : ( , ) 
(iii) If the income of agent i is increased from i y to i y′ the effect on the sacrifice level again rests upon normality. Letting now : ( , ) x y g ′ ′ = − % % , we then get the following estimate:
This means that agent i's sacrifice becomes smaller if her income increases.
(iv) Finally, we suppose that agent i is substituted by another type of agent with a utility function ( , )
i i u x G ′ which represents a weaker preference for the public good than the original utility function ( , )
i i u x G . This intensification of preferences for the public good is described by the assumption that the new utility function everywhere exhibits a higher marginal willingness to pay for the public good, i.e. that
holds for all consumption bundles ( , ) i x G . This condition means that the indifference curve : ( , )
The two indifference curves i u % and i u′ % cannot cross twice because this would violate assumption (6). So, the indifference curve i u′ % must lie above the indifference curve i u % right to i x % which clearly implies that agent i´s sacrifice is reduced.
We summarize these findings as follows:
Proposition 1: The individual sacrifice of an agent becomes higher if (i) the public-good contribution, or
(ii) total public-good supply increases.
The individual sacrifice of an agent is lower if (iii) her income increases, or (iv) her preferences for the public good become stronger.
Equal Sacrifice Allocations
Having developed a concept for the measurement of sacrifice it is now straightforward to characterize equal sacrifice allocations. This is made precise by the next definition. interval. Furthermore, from totally differentiating equation (9) we obtain QED.
The Choice Mechanism
Through Proposition 1 it becomes clear that there are infinitely many equal sacrifice solutions that could, depending on the sacrifice level s, be described by an "equal-sacrifice curve" For a proof, consider the marginal rates of substitution between the public good and the private good along the equal sacrifice curve, i.e. we denote ( ) : In order to show that Using Proposition 3, the mechanism that picks an equal sacrifice solution is now characterized as follows:
Definition 3: Let a public goods economy be given by the income distribution ( 1 ,..., n y y ) and preferences ( 1 ,..., n u u ). Then the equal sacrifice solution for this public goods economy is defined as
where the sacrifice level Given normality, the equal sacrifice solution as characterized by Definition 3 is well-defined and unique.
Comparison with the Literature
It is now straightforward that the equal sacrifice solution according to Definition 3 coincides with the egalitarian-equivalent allocation of the given economy (see Moulin, 1987 Moulin, , 1995 .
Given an income distribution 1 ( ,..., ) n y y and preferences 1 ( ,..., )
From condition (2) we then have 
Properties of the Equal Sacrifice Solutions
In this Section we show that the equal sacrifice solution as characterized in this paper satisfies both the ability-to-pay principle and the benefit principle. (Concerning the empirical relevance of the two principles in the case of global public goods, see Barrett, 2006, pp. 365-366.) To make this precise we first have to define exactly what these principles are to mean.
Concerning ability to pay, we assume that two agents j and k have the same utility It is now a straightforward consequence of Proposition 1 that both principles are satisfied for equal sacrifice solutions. Assume that the public-good contribution of agent k would be smaller than that of agent j if the income of agent k were higher than that of agent j, or agent k's preferences for the public good were stronger than that of agent j. Combining the results of Proposition 1 (i) with those in Proposition 1 (iii) or (iv), respectively, this implies that agent k would have to bear a smaller sacrifice than agent j which contradicts the equal sacrifice assumption.
Conclusion
This paper has shown how, in a standard public goods economy, the venerable equal sacrifice principle can be applied to make a selection among efficient allocations. Unlike the traditional literature, however, we did not make use of losses in cardinally measurable utility as an indicator of individual sacrifice. Instead we obtained a sacrifice measure by transforming the individual expenses for the public good into public-good equivalents. The method by which this transformation was made was borrowed from the willingness-to-pay assessment well known from the contingent valuation techniques used in environmental economics. The public-good allocations, that show an equal sacrifice defined in this way and are also Pareto optimal, turn out to be identical with the egalitarian equivalent solutions as conceived by Moulin (1987) .
Moreover, they satisfy the ability-to-pay and the benefit principles properly defined.
The novel justification of the egalitarian equivalent solution concept provided in this paper also makes it possible to recognize its similarity with the classical Lindahl equilibrium, since the Lindahl mechanism can also be put down to the equal sacrifice principle. The difference, however, is that assessment of the sacrifice as made in our approach is based on total willingness-to-pay or, in an alternative interpretation, average valuation of the public good, whereas the Lindahl solution rests upon the valuation of the public-goods contribution according to marginal willingness-to-pay. In special cases both equal sacrifice solutions may coincide but generally they will be different.
Measuring individual sacrifice by total valuations as in the present paper, takes into account more information about individual preferences than the Lindahl approach in which assessment of sacrifice is only based on marginal willingness-to-pay at a single point. In a world of full information, as assumed here (and also in the standard treatments of the Lindahl and the egalitarian equivalent solution concepts), the solution described in this paper is therefore based on a more accurate valuation of individual sacrifice than is its Lindahl counterpart. In the general case with non-homogenous Cobb-Douglas preferences an explicit comparison between the two solutions is difficult to make since no closed form expression for the Moulin outcome exists in this case.
